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Abstract. This paper estimates a Structural Dynamic Factor Model on a panel of 102
US quarterly series. We model economic comovements by means of 5 underlying structural
shocks (oil price, productivity, aggregate demand, monetary policy, and housing demand).
The results of the benchmark model (impulse responses and variance decompositions) are
in line with those predicted by economic theory and usually estimated by the empirical
literature. We show that while over the whole sample the contribution of the housing demand
shock is negligible, after the early eighties’ liberalizations in housing ﬁnance, the housing
demand shock has become a substantial source of business cycle ﬂuctuations. The model is
then used to analyze the causes of the 2008 recession: results indicate that we cannot exclude
that monetary policy played a non negligible role in leading the way for the downturn in
residential investment and the ensuing recession.
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1. introduction
Since the beginning of 2006 residential investment in the US has collapsed and so have
house prices. Between September and October 2008, as banks started showing huge losses due
to the “sub-prime mortgage bubble”, a furious storm hit the stock market. The bank crisis has
been so profound that public intervention has been necessary to avoid the default of major
ﬁnancial institutions (like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Citibank among others). From the
ﬁnancial market, the contagion propagated to the real economy and to the rest of the world,
resulting in a severe recession of global proportions.
Policy analysts and economists are debating which policies are needed in order to minimize
the negative eﬀects of the crisis, and help the economy to re-enter a path of stable growth.
At the same time, many among them are trying to identify the causes of the crisis, pointing
to the late nineties’ ﬁnancial deregulation, to FED policy after 9/11, and to the real estate
market bubble.
In this paper we estimate a Structural Dynamic Factor Model (SDFM) on a panel of US
macroeconomic variables. The objective is twofold: from a methodological point of view, and
following the seminal works of Stock and Watson (2005) and Forni et al. (2009), we show how
SDFMs are a powerful tool suitable for policy analysis; while from a policy analysis point of
view, we use our model to shed light on the causes of the current recession.
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In order to understand what the causes of this recession are, it is, obviously, ﬁrst necessary to
determine how many shocks drive the economy, that is how many forces characterize business
cycle ﬂuctuations. Economic theory has in fact focused on a variety of shocks of diﬀerent
types but it has not agreed yet on which of these are signiﬁcant sources of ﬂuctuations. In
this regard, the recent crisis has focused attention on the housing sector: does the housing
sector simply reﬂect macroeconomic activity, or is it a source of business cycle ﬂuctuations?
Factor models are a recently developed econometric tool that has received increasing atten-
tion in the last ten years because they are suitable for the analysis of large databases. The
interest in large databases comes from the consideration that a handful of variables may not
be suﬃcient to span the space of structural shocks. Moreover, typical professional literature,
such as economic reports from central banks or other economic institutions, contains analyses
of the behavior of a large number of series. This suggests that all these series are considered
by policymakers as containing signiﬁcant information about the state of the economy. It is
therefore necessary to take them into account in econometric analysis, lest we may miss a not
irrelevant part of the picture.
Factor models are also particularly appropriate for our purpose because, diﬀerently from
other empirical models, they help identify the sources of the ﬂuctuations by inferring the
number of shocks directly from the data through diﬀerent statistics and selection criteria,
rather than choosing them on apriori grounds.
The main idea behind factor models is that ﬂuctuations in the economy depends from a
few structural shocks aﬀecting all variables, and from many idiosyncratic shocks (generally
not of interest) resulting for example from measurement error, or from sectoral or regional
dynamics, that inﬂuence one or few variables. Therefore each variable in the dataset can
be decomposed into a common component that is driven by the structural shocks, and an
idiosyncratic component. Hence, by concentrating attention on the co-movements (i.e. the
common components) only, it is computationally feasible to analyze large databases.
Classical factor models are indeed a common tool for many sciences but did not achieve
success in economic analysis until recently. This is so because they rely on the hypothesis that
the idiosyncratic components are cross-sectionally uncorrelated, an hypothesis that clearly
does not hold with economic data. However, recent research has demonstrated that consistent
estimation of a factor model can be obtained with the method of static/generalized/dynamic
principal components, even though the idiosyncratic component are “weakly” correlated in
both dimensions (Bai and Ng 2002, Bai 2003, Forni et al. 2000, 2004, 2005, Forni and Lippi
2001, Stock and Watson 2002b). Thus estimating factor models on large datasets has become
not only computationally feasible, but also economically meaningful. These improvements
make factor models extremely appealing for economists: nowadays they are used in forecasting
(Stock and Watson 2002a, and Forni et al. 2003), construction of leading coincident indicators
(Altissimo et al. 2010), structural analysis (Forni et al. 2009, and Eickmeier 2009), and policy
analysis (Bernanke et al. 2005, Stock and Watson 2005, and Forni and Gambetti 2010).
Our paper is related to the applied factor models literature, in particular with Giannone
et al. (2002, 2004), Forni and Gambetti (2010), and Forni et al. (2009) that use a purely
structural factor approach to identify economic shocks, and to a smaller extent to Bernanke
et al. (2005) and Stock and Watson (2005) that, however, use the so-called Factor Augmented
VAR (FAVAR) approach. We contribute to this literature because we perform full identiﬁca-
tion of economic shocks, and by doing so we are able to understand what forces characterize
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point of view as we analyze both the role of structural shocks over time (the housing sector
in particular), and, especially, their role in determining the 2008 recession.
Our analysis uses a panel of 102 quarterly series from 1963:1 to 2007:4 describing the US
economy. We estimate that the business cycle is driven by 5 structural shocks that we identify
as the oil price shock, the productivity shock, the aggregate demand shock, the monetary
policy shock, and the housing demand shock. The impulse response functions estimated with
the benchmark model are in line with those predicted by economic theory and those usually
estimated by empirical literature. Estimation of the forecast error variance decomposition
points out that GDP growth is mainly driven by productivity shocks (26%), aggregate demand
shocks (35%), and monetary policy shocks (23%), while inﬂation is driven in the short run
almost entirely by oil shocks (82%), and in the long run by monetary policy shocks (19%) and
aggregate demand shocks (19%). It is noteworthy that, the contribution of housing demand
shocks is almost negligible: they account for only 0.9% of residential investments, and 0.8%
of GDP growth volatility. This result suggests that the housing market just passively reﬂect
macroeconomic dynamics.
We then investigate the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization. In line with the existing literature
(Cardarelli et al. 2008 and Iacoviello and Neri 2010), we ﬁnd that after the reforms in the
housing ﬁnance sector started in the early eighties, housing demand shocks account for a
relevant portion of model variability (26% of GDP, and 25% of residential investments), thus
pointing out the importance of the housing market in determining business cycles ﬂuctuations.
This result conﬁrms the importance of the housing market as a source of business cycles
ﬂuctuations thus turning the conclusion reached through the estimation over the whole sample
upside down.
To conclude, we use our model to analyze the sources that lie behind the ﬂuctuations in
the new millennium. As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we ﬁnd that monetary policy shocks
are the main responsible for the downturn of residential investment that started in early 2006.
This is indeed an important result: in fact, if we put together our results and the evidence
provided by Leamer (2007), according to which “eight of the ten [US] recessions were preceded
by sustained and substantial problems in housing” (p. 164), we then cannot exclude that
monetary policy shocks played a non negligible role in leading the way for the 2008 recession.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 explains the econometric methodol-
ogy, and section 3 presents the result of the estimation. Section 4 tests the robustness of the
model to diﬀerent speciﬁcations, while section 5 discusses sub-sample analysis. In section 6
we use our model to analyze the ﬂuctuations that characterized the new millennium and the
causes of the 2008 recession; ﬁnally, section 7 concludes.
2. the model
2.1. The Dynamic Factor Models. Let xt be an N1 vector of zero mean, ﬁnite second
order moment, stationary variables, a “Dynamic Factor Model” is deﬁned as:
(2.1) xt = (L)ft + t = t + t; for t = 1;:::;T;
where ft is a q  1 vector of common factors, with q  N, (L) = (0 + 1L + ::: + sLs)
is an N  q matrix polynomial of dynamic factor loadings of ﬁnite order s,1 and t and t
are N 1 vectors containing respectively the common and the idiosyncratic component. The
1In the case where s is allowed to be inﬁnite the literature referred to this model as the “Generalized Dynamic
Factor Model” (Forni et al. 2000, 2004, Forni and Lippi 2001).4 M. LUCIANI
dynamic factors and the idiosyncratic components are assumed to be uncorrelated at all leads
and lags (E(ft;is) = 0, 8 t;i;s), while the idiosyncratic components are allowed to be both
serially and cross-sectionally correlated albeit by a limited amount (E(it;js) =  < 1, 8
t;i;j;s). The dynamic factors ft are assumed to evolve over time according to a VAR(p)
(2.2) 	(L)ft = t
where 	(L) is a matrix lag polynomial, and t is the q  1 vector of (iid) dynamic factors
innovations or common shocks. Hence, by plugging (2.2) in (2.1) we can rewrite xt as a
function of the common shocks and the idiosyncratic components:
(2.3) xt = (L)D(L)t + t
where D(L) = 	(L) 1.
Given a dynamic factor model such as (2.1), it is always possible to rewrite it in a static
representation with r = q(s + 1) static factors:
xt = Ft + t; for t = 1;:::;T; (2.4)
A(L)Ft = ut; with ut = Gt (2.5)
where Ft = [f0
t 1 f0
t 2 ::: f0
t s]0 is an r 1 vector containing the static factors,  = [0 1 :::
s] is an N  r matrix of factor loadings, A(L) is a matrix lag polynomial, and G is an r  q
matrix of rank q. Starting from the static factor representation (2.4) we can as well express
the xs as a function of the common shocks and the idiosyncratic components: by rewriting Ft
in his moving average representation
(2.6) Ft = C(L)t
where C(L) = B(L)G, and B(L) = A(L) 1 we have that:
(2.7) xt = C(L)t + t:
2.2. Estimation. If assumptions A)-D) in Bai and Ng (2002) and Bai (2003), and the as-
sumption of Lemma 1 in Bai and Ng (2007) hold, then (i) the number of factors r can be
estimated by means of the information criteria (IC or PC) proposed by Bai and Ng (2002)
(Lemma 1 in Bai and Ng 2007), and (ii) the space spanned by the static factors, and the
common and idiosyncratic components can be consistently estimated using the method of
principal component (Theorem 1 in Bai and Ng 2002): let X be the T  N standardized
data matrix, and X = (X0X) be the covariance matrix of the N variables, then by using
the normalization 0=N = Ir the matrix  can be estimated as: ^  = V
p
N where V is the
matrix containing the r eigenvectors associated with the largest eigenvalues of X, and the
static factors can be estimated as ^ F = X^ =N, where ^ F =[ ^ F1 ^ F2 ::: ^ FT]0.
Under the same assumptions if the static factors are estimated with the method of principal
components using the normalization 0=N = Ir, then (i) the space spanned by the uts can
be consistently estimated by the residuals from a VAR(p) on the static factors ^ Ft (lemma 2 in
Bai and Ng 2007), and (ii) the number of dynamic factors q can be consistently estimated by
the statistics D1 and D2 proposed by Bai and Ng (2007) (Proposition 2 in Bai and Ng 2007).
Alternatively, other criteria to estimate the number of dynamic factors have been proposed
by Amengual and Watson (2007), by Hallin and Li˜ ska (2007), and by Onatski (2009).
Once ut is estimated and q is determined, the common shocks can be retrieved as ^ t =
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variance-covariance matrix u, while   is the rq matrix containing the associated eigenvec-
tors, and therefore ^  = Iq by construction.
2.3. The Structural Factor Model. The common shocks in equation (2.7) have no eco-
nomic interpretation as they are simply uncorrelated white noises. However, Forni et al.
(2009) shows that the shocks t span the same space of the structural macroeconomic shocks:
structural shocks, and structural impulse response functions, can therefore be retrieve by a
suitable rotation of the common shocks; that means we need to ﬁnd an orthonormal matrix
that satisfy a set of economically meaningful just-identifying restrictions.
Following Forni et al. (2009) we assume that the xs are driven by q structural shocks ",
that is:
(2.8) xt = (L)"t + t
that implies, (L) = C(L)H, and "t = H0t, with H s.t. HH0 = I. The rotation matrix H
can thus be estimated by imposing enough (economically meaningful) just-identifying restric-
tions on the N q structural impulse response matrix (L), and then by solving the ensuing
system of equations. As in Structural VAR analysis, identiﬁcation can be achieved by im-
posing zero restrictions on the contemporaneous impact matrix (0), on the long run impact
impact matrix (1), and by sign restrictions. However, diﬀerently from SVAR analysis, the
number of restrictions necessary to achieve identiﬁcation depends on the number of shocks q
rather than the number of variables N.2
3. the empirical analysis
3.1. The Data. The analysis has been carried out on a panel of 130 quarterly series from
1963:1 to 2007:4 (N= 130, T= 180) describing the US economy. The variables cover 12
diﬀerent categories: Industrial Production, Consumer Price Indexes, Producer Price Indexes,
Monetary Aggregates, Banking, GDP and Components, Housing Sector, Productivity & Cost,
Interest Rates, Employment and Population, Business/Fiscal, Financial Markets. All variables
have been ﬁrst transformed to reach stationarity according to an ADF test where the number
of lags has been selected with the BIC and the maximum number of lag has been set to
4; and then demeaned and standardized (see the appendix for the complete list of variables
and transformations). The results of the ADF test are pretty clear for all variables but for
prices and interests rates (ﬁgure 1). This is indeed a long debate in economics: as it has
been pointed out by Galí (1992) we have to have that the interest rate and inﬂation are
integrated of the same order, otherwise we would have that the real rate is not a stationary
process, something that is incompatible with a steady state equilibrium. Similarly, prices and
monetary aggregates have to be integrated of the same order because a non stationary growth
rate of real balances “is diﬃcult to reconcile with reasonable speciﬁcations of money demand”
(Galí 1992 p. 717). Our tests do not clarify whether the interests rates are I(1) or I(0), and
whether prices are integrated of order one or two, while all monetary aggregates are tested to
be I(1). Following the literature (Peersman 2005, and Gerlach and Smets 1995) we consider
the interests rate I(0) and prices I(1).
2Recall that (i) any unitary matrix H can be written as
Q
l;q Rl;q where Rl;q is an identity matrix with
elements R(l;l) = R(q;q) = cos(j) and R(l;q) =  R(q;l) = sin(j), 0  j  2, that is the product of all
possible bivariate rotation; and (ii) in any qq unitary matrix there are q(q 1)=2 possible bivariate rotations.
Therefore, in order to achieve identiﬁcation we need q(q   1)=2 restrictions.6 M. LUCIANI
Boivin and Ng (2006), by starting from the consideration that in factor models analysis the
selection of variables is a subjective choice of the researcher, investigate whether it is always
worth adding series to the database or not and ﬁnd that, when adding extra variables imply
adding cross-section correlation between idiosyncratic components, estimation and forecast
performances of the model are poorer than without adding these variables. In fact, as we
have seen in the previous section, the space spanned by the static factors can be consistently
estimated if the idiosyncratic errors are weakly correlated in both dimensions (assumption C
in Bai and Ng 2002). However, quite surprisingly this hypothesis is not tested when empirical
analysis is performed. It follows that, perhaps due to excess correlation between idiosyncratic
components, the information criteria cited in the previous section often perform poorly.
In our analysis, we follow the intuition of Boivin and Ng (2006), and select the variables
by applying a heuristic procedure consisting in the following steps: 1) select the number of
static factors; 2) for each variable compute: (i) the two highest cross-correlation coeﬃcients
in absolute value, (ii) the average (of the absolute value) cross-correlation coeﬃcients, (iii)
the ﬁrst order autocorrelation coeﬃcients, and (iv) the percentage of variance explained by
the common components; 3) by looking at these statistics, try to understand whether a series
adds information or noise.
By applying this procedure we end up with a database of 102 variables. Table 3 shows
how the cross-correlation has diminished consistently given that the share of variables with
the highest cross-correlation coeﬃcient higher than .7 drops from 48% to 15%. A diﬀerent
possibility would have been to follow Stock and Watson (2008) and estimating the factors by
excluding those series that by construction are the sum of other series contained in the database
such as GDP, CPI, etc. By applying the Stock and Watson (2008) criteria we would end up
with a much smaller database (87 variables) that, on the other hand, would be characterized
by an amount of cross correlation less relevant (table 3).
3.2. The Number of Factors. In order to select the number of static factors we have applied
the IC criteria of Bai and Ng (2002) and the reﬁnements of Alessi et al. (2008), in both cases
the number of maximum possible static factors is set equal to 20. The Bai and Ng (2002) IC1
and IC2 criteria suggest respectively 9 and 8 factors, while the IC3 fails to converge (table 4);
the Alessi et al. (2008) criteria, instead, suggest 5 factors (graph 2). Given that we want a
model that is able to capture most of the variability in GDP, we can immediately rule out the
hypothesis of 5 static factors: it explains only 65% of GDP variance while with 8 or 9 factors
we explain 90% of variation. Between 8 and 9 factors we are indiﬀerent: there is no particular
reason to add an extra factor when 8 factors are considered. Therefore, our ﬁnal choice will
be to pick a more parsimonious speciﬁcation for the model with 8 factors.
To select the number of dynamic factors we apply the Bai and Ng (2007) statistics, the
Amengual and Watson (2007) and Hallin and Li˜ ska (2007) criteria, and the test proposed
by (Onatski 2009).3 The Bai and Ng (2007) D1 and D2 criteria suggest the presence of
respectively 6 or 5 dynamic factors (table 5); the IC criterion applied using the Amengual
and Watson (2007) methodology suggests between 5 and 8 dynamic factors, while the PC
suggests between 6 and 8 (table 6); ﬁnally, Hallin and Li˜ ska (2007) log criteria suggest either
2, or 3 dynamic factors depending on the applied penalizing function (graph 3), while the
3The uts are obtained by estimating a VAR(1) for the 8 static factors. Regarding the number of lags to include
in the VAR, the BIC suggests 1 lag, the HQ criteria suggests 2, while the AIC does not converge. We chose
p = 1 because by looking at the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function of the factors it does not
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test proposed by Onatski (2009) (table 7) suggests q = 6. Table 8 shows the average forecast
error variance decomposition explained by each dynamic factor at diﬀerent horizons, where
the averages are taken over the common components of each variable. As we can see while the
ﬁrst three dynamic factors explain only 60% of total variation, the ﬁrst ﬁve account for 80%,
with the sixth dynamic factors accounting for 8%. Summing up: the criteria are pretty ﬂat
between 5-8 dynamic factors, while the average forecast error variance decomposition suggests
a parsimonious choice of 5 or 6 factors. Given this little uncertainty, we choose 5 dynamic
factors because it is a speciﬁcation easier to reconcile with theoretical macroeconomic models
to which we need to refer in the choice of the identifying restrictions necessary to obtain a
structural model.
3.3. The Structural Model. Once we have established the dimension of the factor space we
can identify and therefore interpret shocks from an economic point of view. As said already in
section 2.3, the task here is to ﬁnd an orthogonal rotation matrix H such that "t = H0t, where
the s are the dynamic factor innovations (or common shocks), and the "s are the structural
shocks. Given that we have established that t is a 51 vector we concentrate on the subsystem

q
t = (qq)(L)"t, where: (i) 
q
t is a 5  1 vector containing the common component of: oil
price (oil), real GDP (y), CPI (p), FED Funds rate (i), and real residential investment




iLi and the 
q
i are
5  5 matrices containing the structural impulse responses for [oil y p i y]0 to the ﬁve
structural shocks "t; and, ﬁnally, (iii) "t is a 5  1 vector containing the structural shocks.
We assume that the model is driven by the following structural shocks: the oil price shock
("oil), the productivity shock ("p), the aggregate demand shock ("ad), the monetary policy
shock ("mp), and the housing demand shock ("hd). We think of the oil price shock as an event
that has occurred in the oil market and that cannot be explained by our model; productivity
shocks are, for example, those coming from the result of R&D activity, from the implemen-
tation in the production process of more productive capital goods, or from organizational
changes; monetary policy shocks are movements in the interest rate essentially determined by
the Federal Reserve that cannot be explained by the model (for an exhaustive discussion on
monetary policy shocks see Christiano et al. 1999); housing demand shocks are trivially inter-
preted as movements in the demand for houses that cannot be explained by the determinants
of housing demand, as might be deriving, for example, from shifts in consumer preferences,
or from ﬁnancial innovations that allow a larger share of population to be eligible for a mort-
gage. Finally, aggregate demand shocks are a broader concept: we can think of them as shocks
to consumption, investment, or public expenditure, that is as shocks to the components of
aggregate demand, which cannot be explained by the model.
In order to compute H we use a mix of short and long run restrictions. Our identiﬁcation
scheme is an upgraded version of the one used by Peersman (2005), that in its turn is an
upgraded version of the scheme derived by Gerlach and Smets (1995) and Monticelli and
Tristani (1999) from a closed version of the IS-LM model. Identiﬁcation relies on the following
restrictions:
(1) the oil shock can aﬀect all variables without restrictions, while all other shocks have
no contemporaneous eﬀects on oil price (4 restrictions);
(2) we rely on a vertical Phillips curve, and therefore we allow only supply (i.e. oil and
productivity) shocks to aﬀect GDP in the long run (3 restrictions);8 M. LUCIANI
(3) in order to distinguish between aggregate demand and monetary policy shocks, we
assume no contemporaneous eﬀect of the monetary policy shock on output (1 restric-
tion);
(4) in order to identify the housing demand shock, we assume that the contemporaneous
impact of the housing demand shock is the same for residential investment and for
output (1 restriction);
(5) ﬁnally, in order to close the model, we assume that the housing demand shock has no
contemporaneous eﬀect on CPI (1 restriction).
3.3.1. Some Comments on the Identiﬁcation Scheme. Restriction (1) is suggested by Peers-
man (2005) and by Blanchard and Galí (2010): it relies on the assumption that although the
US are the leading world economy, the oil price is determined on a world market and therefore
US shocks are able to inﬂuence oil market only after these shocks have spread over the whole
economy. This assumption has been criticized by Lippi and Nobili (2009) that in their empir-
ical analysis show that the oil price is inﬂuenced by US business cycle ﬂuctuations. Moreover,
this restriction has also been criticized because it does not allow disentangling whether the
shock stems from the demand side or the supply side of the crude oil market. In fact, Lippi
and Nobili (2009) and Kilian (2009) show how oil supply and oil demand shocks have diﬀerent
eﬀects on the US economy. However, we follow Blanchard and Galí (2010) that points out
how “what matters [...] to any given country is not the level of global oil production, but the
price at which ﬁrms and households can purchase oil”, and how “if the price of oil rises as a
result of, say, higher Chinese demand, this is just like an exogenous oil supply shock for the
remaining countries” (p. 15).
Restrictions (4) and (5) are suggested by Jarociñski and Smets (2008): the idea is that
housing demand shocks aﬀect contemporaneously only residential investments and no other
component of GDP. Hence the impact of housing demand shocks on prices can be negligible.
In addition to these two restrictions Jarociñski and Smets (2008), use also sign restrictions to
distinguish between housing demand and housing supply shocks. Similarly, Cardarelli et al.
(2008) identify housing shocks by imposing zero contemporaneous restrictions on GDP, the
GDP deﬂator, and the policy interest rates, and by using sign restrictions they disentangle
between housing demand and housing supply shocks. In our scheme, we identify housing
shocks by means of restriction (4) and (5) and we are able to disentangle between housing
demand and housing supply shocks by imposing a long run neutrality restriction (2) of housing
demand shocks on GDP. This long run restrictions is both theoretically coherent with the
overall identiﬁcation scheme, and supported by the empirical literature as both Cardarelli
et al. (2008) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) ﬁnd that while housing supply shocks have long
run eﬀects on GDP (albeit small), housing demand shocks are neutral in the long run.
Finally, restrictions (2) and (3) are widely used in VAR literature (see among others, Blan-
chard and Quah 1989, and Galí 1992 for restriction (2), and Bernanke and Blinder 1992, for
restriction (3)).
3.4. Impulse Responses. Figure 4 and 5 show the response of oil price, GDP, CPI, FED
Funds Rate, Residential Investment, and of the real house price to the ﬁve identiﬁed structural
shocks respectively with and without conﬁdence band. Overall, the impulse responses follow
the expected pattern, with the main exception to this proposition being the response of the
oil price. However, given that the behavior of oil price is not the focus of this paper, we do
not consider the sometimes non intuitive responses of oil prices to the shocks as invalidating
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Before commenting the impulse responses, a clariﬁcation on conﬁdence bands is necessary.
Conﬁdence intervals are obtained with a bootstrap procedure that works as follows: let ~ xd
t be
the data generated by the d-th draw, then ~ xd
t = ~ d
t + ~ d
t , where (i) ~ d
t is obtained through a
normal bootstrap procedure applied on the estimated structural shocks, ~ d
t = ^ (L)^ "d
t; and (ii)
~ d
t is obtained through a block-bootstrap procedure on the estimated idiosyncratic component
(^ t), where the length of the block was set to 20 quarters, large enough to retain the cyclical
information in the series.4
Figure 4 shows impulse responses together with 68% conﬁdence band obtained through the
procedure just described with 1000 draws. Unfortunately, conﬁdence bands are often wide
and are not centered around the point estimates. The fact that point estimates sometimes
lie outside the bands depends from the bias induced by the estimation of the VAR on the
static factors. Wide conﬁdence bands, instead, might depend on the data treatment. Namely,
when some series are not “fully stationary”, conﬁdence bands tend to be wide. As we have
discuss in section 3.1, in our dataset this is the case of the interest rates, prices, and monetary
aggregates. Not surprisingly, wide conﬁdence band can be found both in Bernanke et al.
(2005) and in Forni and Gambetti (2010) that apply the same data transformations that we
have used. In addition, wide conﬁdence bands are a problem that often arise when using long
run restrictions (Monticelli and Tristani 1999 and Peersman 2005).
5 Hence, we conclude that
these problems with conﬁdence bands do not represent a major weakness of the analysis.
3.4.1. Oil Shock. The eﬀects of a positive oil shock is the same as it would be expected from
an exogenous increase in the production costs: the oil price increases substantially reaching a
peak after 5 quarters and then smoothly decreases to a new equilibrium level (0.887); GDP
falls down permanently (-0.7430), with a substantial decrease in the ﬁrst 12 quarters; inﬂation
increase substantially in the ﬁrst three quarters and then smoothly returns to zero, with the
ﬁnal result of a permanent increase in the price level (1.3187); in response to inﬂation, the
interest rate increases for the ﬁrst three quarters and then returns slowly to its steady state
equilibrium; ﬁnally, similarly to GDP, residential investment falls for the ﬁrst four quarters
and then stabilizes.
3.4.2. Productivity Shock. As predicted by economic theory, a positive productivity shock
produces a permanent increase in GDP (0.8307) and residential investment (0.4499), while
it produces a permanent decrease in prices (-0.5797). Finally, the interest rate decreases
following the disinﬂation and then slowly returns to the base line.
3.4.3. Aggregate Demand Shock. After a positive aggregate demand shock, GDP increases for
the ﬁrst three quarters and then starts decreasing to return to the baseline; inﬂation increases
reaching a peak after one quarter and then slowly decreases eventually reaching zero (with a
permanent increase of prices of 1.417); the interest rate following inﬂation increases and after
two quarters starts returning to the baseline; ﬁnally residential investments rise above their
4A diﬀerent possibility would have been to follow Bernanke et al. (2005) who suggest to apply a bootstrap after
bootstrap (Kilian 1998) algorithm on the us, or Forni et al. (2009) who suggest to apply a block bootstrap
algorithm on the xs. However, while conﬁdence bands obtained with the latter method were heavily not
centered around the point estimates, we apriori excluded the method suggested by Bernanke et al. (2005)
because it ignores the uncertainty brought about the presence of the idiosyncratic components.
5Faust and Leeper (1997) show how given that the matrix of long run multiplier is estimated imprecisely unless
restrictive restrictions are imposed, the inference under long run restriction schemes is likely to be unreliable.10 M. LUCIANI
equilibrium level for the ﬁrst quarter and then reach an equilibrium level lower than the level
pre-shock (-0.4021).
The reaction of residential investment is somewhat puzzling: we see that an aggregate
demand shock has transitory eﬀects on GDP due to the restriction imposed, while it has
permanent eﬀects on residential investment, i.e. a component of GDP that we would expect
to be aﬀected only temporary by that shock. Of course, we cannot expect that the model
estimate a zero long run response for all GDP components unless we explicitly impose such
restriction. Therefore, given that we have imposed the restriction that aggregate demand
shocks are neutral in the long run with respect to GDP only, we do not consider the response
of GDP components as a sign of rejection of our identiﬁcation scheme. The problem would
arise if the model estimates a positive/negative long run eﬀect of an aggregate demand shock
for all components, something that would not make sense. At least we need to have that on
some components the long run eﬀect is positive and on some other is negative. Luckily, table
9 shows that this is the situation and therefore we can consider the reaction of residential
investment easily understood.
3.4.4. Monetary Policy Shock. After a positive (tighten) monetary policy shock GDP falls
down reaching a peak after 3 quarters and then returning to the baseline, while prices perma-
nently decrease (-1.5587) by starting to fall substantially only after three quarters. The FED
funds rate rises at time zero and then decreases under its baseline level reaching a minimum
after four quarters and then returning to the baseline. The response of the interest rates to
the monetary policy shock might be puzzling as it falls below the baseline level faster than is
usually estimated by the literature (Stock and Watson (2005) and Forni and Gambetti (2010)
for example). However, a similar path has been estimated by Galí (1992) as the eﬀect of a
money supply shock.
Finally, monetary policy seems to aﬀect the housing market. Residential investment falls
substantially for the ﬁrst two quarters and then starts increasing by reaching a post shock level
lower than the pre shock one (-0.1857).
6 Moreover, in accordance to other empirical analysis,
ﬁgure 6 shows how (i) the impact on residential investment is quicker and stronger than on
consumption expenditure (Calza et al. 2009), and (ii) the impact of a monetary policy shock
on the housing market is similar across US regions (Vargas-Silva 2008a, 2008b)
3.4.5. Housing Demand Shock. Not surprisingly, the housing demand shock mimics the eﬀect
of an aggregate demand shock: GDP increases (for the ﬁrst six quarters by a small amount)
and slowly returns to the baseline; prices permanently increase, but quite interestingly they
are a little bit slower than output in reacting to the shock and start rising only after nine
quarters; the interest rate after decreasing at time zero goes up reaching a maximum after one
quarter and slowly approaches its baseline.
Finally, residential investment stay above their baseline level for the ﬁrst 5 quarters and then
reach a permanent level below the baseline (-0.0228),7 while, coherently with what expected
6As we have argued for the aggregate demand shock, the fact that residential investment are aﬀected in the
long run by monetary policy is a little bit puzzling. However as we have explained in section 3.4.3, this
is a consequence of the long run restriction on GDP, that is it is a mathematical fact with no economic
interpretation.
7Once again, in order to explain why housing demand shocks have long run eﬀects on residential investments,
we resort to the same argument we have used in section 3.4.3: it is a consequence of the long run restriction
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from an housing demand shock, real house prices increase for the ﬁrst 6 quarters and then
stabilize to a post shock level higher than the pre-shock one (0.0666).
3.5. Variance Decomposition. Table 10 shows the contribution of each structural shock to
the variance of the forecast error for the common components of the oil price, GDP, CPI, FED
Funds Rate, Residential Investment, and the real house price. The common component of oil
price is substantially driven by oil price shocks that account for almost 90% of total variation.
GDP growth is mainly driven by productivity and aggregate demand shocks that combined
account for almost 70% of its common component variation after 5 years, with a non negligible
contribution of monetary policy shocks (25%). CPI inﬂation is mainly driven by oil shocks that
in the short run account for more than 90% of common component variation at the time of the
shock, while after ﬁve years they account for 50%; monetary policy shocks (21%) and aggregate
demand shocks (21%) are other relevant sources of prices’ variation at the 5 years horizon. The
FED funds rate common component is mainly driven in the short run by aggregate demand
shocks (41%), monetary policy shocks (37%), and productivity shocks (15%), while the 5 years
variation depends mainly on monetary policy shocks (49%), and aggregate demand shocks
(34%) only. The common component of residential investments growth is mainly driven by
aggregate demand shocks (27%), and monetary policy shocks (52%), while quite surprisingly
housing demand shocks accounts only for 1.3% of total variation. Quite similarly, the common
component of the real house price is driven by monetary shocks (65%), and productivity shocks
(21%).
Overall the results are reasonable and do not give rise to puzzles. Coherently with our
assumptions the oil price is driven almost entirely by oil price shocks (i.e. the oil market).
GDP growth ﬂuctuations are equally due to a mixture of real (oil price and productivity) and
nominal (AD and monetary policy) shocks. Similarly, inﬂation in the long run depends on
all shocks, whereas in the short run it is almost totally driven by oil price shocks. In fact,
all shocks need ﬁrst to propagate over the whole economy, and then are able to inﬂuence
inﬂation. Diﬀerently, increases in oil price spread to gasoline prices, a relevant component of
CPI inﬂation, almost without frictions.
It is noteworthy that, the contribution of housing demand shocks is almost negligible thus
suggesting that the housing market just passively reﬂect macroeconomic dynamics. In fact,
housing demand shocks account only for 0.9% of residential investments, and 0.8% of GDP
growth volatility.
The housing market, instead, is strongly inﬂuenced by monetary policy: we estimate that
monetary policy shocks account for 35.7% of residential investment (52% of the common
components), a ﬁgure higher than those estimated for the US by Jarociñski and Smets (2008)
(14% by estimating a BVAR from 1987 to 2007) and by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) (between
15 and 20% by estimating a DSGE model from 1965-2006).8 In section 5.2 we will discuss
extensively this result and those presented in the previous paragraph, particularly so because
when estimating the model in subsample these results change substantially.
4. robustness analysis
In this section we evaluate the robustness of our results with respect to the model speciﬁ-
cation.
8For an exhaustive review of the eﬀects of monetary policy on the housing market see Mishkin 2007.12 M. LUCIANI
In section 3.2 we were indiﬀerent between including 8 or 9 static factors in the model.
Similarly, in footnote 3 we were indiﬀerent between including 1 or 2 lags in the VAR model
that characterize the law of motion of the static factors. Given this uncertainty, in this section
we compute IRF and FEVD for two diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we allow
for a diﬀerent law of motion of the static factors (ra1 = fr = 8, p = 2, q = 5g), while
in the second speciﬁcation we allow for a diﬀerent number of static factors ra2 = fr = 9,
p = 1, q = 5g. Although overall the impulse responses obtained with ra1 and ra2 looks very
similar to those obtained with our benchmark speciﬁcation (ra0 = fr = 8, p = 1, q = 5g),
some diﬀerences can be noticed (ﬁgure 7). First, when allowing for two lags in the VAR for
the static factors (ra1), two puzzles come out: (i) after a positive productivity shock prices
decrease and then slowly tend to return to their baseline level; and, (ii) after a positive housing
demand shock prices decrease. However, given that these two shocks account for such a small
percentage of the variance of prices inﬂation (respectively 3.5% and 0.5%, ﬁgure 8), we do
not consider these two puzzles as invalidating the robustness of our estimates. Second, when
the model is estimated with 9 static factors (ra2), the responses to a housing demand shock
are larger in magnitude than those estimated with 8 static factors. In fact, in ra2 the portion
of variance explained by the housing demand shock is larger than in the other speciﬁcations
(ﬁgure 8), and therefore the magnitude of the impulse responses is larger. However, once again
given that the diﬀerence between the portion of variance explained with ra2 (9.9%) and with
ra0 (1.2%) is not that large we do not consider this result as invalidating the robustness of
our estimates.
In section 3.2 we have estimated the presence of at least ﬁve dynamic factors, i.e. of at
least 5 sources of ﬂuctuations (structural shocks). To test the robustness of this speciﬁcation,
we investigate the properties of the model if less than ﬁve dynamic factors are considered.
This will in turn also help to better understand the role of shocks. Thus we estimate a model
with four structural shocks by eliminating the housing demand shock and by using the same
identiﬁcation scheme used by Peersman (2005), and we estimate a model with three structural
shocks by estimating an IS-LM model as in Gerlach and Smets (1995) and Monticelli and
Tristani (1999). Figure 9 plots impulse responses and ﬁgure 10 plots the ﬁve years forecasts
error variance decomposition for diﬀerent q.9 Regarding IRF, the results for q = 5 or q = 4
are almost identical, while when estimating the model with just three dynamic factors (i.e.
by excluding the oil shocks) the reaction to a monetary shock is puzzling given that it is in
contrast with the prediction of the theoretical model (IS-LM) supporting the identiﬁcation
scheme. Regarding FEVD, the model with q = 3 gives plausible results, while comparing the
model with q = 5 and q = 4 the diﬀerent role of the oil shock is obvious; in particular in
the model with four dynamic factors fully 90% of GDP, and only 10% of CPI, variation is
determined by the oil shock: these ﬁgures seem quite incredible.
Summing up, the model seems robust with respect to the number of static factors and the
number of lags used in the VAR on the static factors, while when considering a smaller number
of dynamic factors, as often is suggested by economic theory and apriori imposed in many
econometric models, either IRF (q = 3) or FEVD (q = 4) are inconsistent with economic
theory.
9IRF and FEVD are obtained by setting r = 9 and p = 1 in the speciﬁcations with three and four dynamic
factors, while when q = 5 we used our benchmark speciﬁcation with r = 8, and p = 1. We ha choose this
combination of r and p because it is the one that gives the best results in terms of the speciﬁcation with three
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5. sub-sample analysis
In this section we investigate the possibility that the US economy has experienced structural
changes. We ﬁrst perform structural break analysis to identify if/when changes have occurred.
Once we have identiﬁed possible structural breaks, we can perform the structural estimation
in diﬀerent sub-samples thus evaluating the consequences of these structural breaks.
5.1. Testing for Structural Breaks. Stock and Watson (2002b) (thm. 3) demonstrates
that the space spanned by the static factors can be consistently estimated if there is limited
time variation in the factor loadings. Once the factor space is consistently estimated, a test for
breaks in the is can be treated almost as a classical structural breaks testing problem on the
linear regression model xi = 0
i ^ Ft+i, where ^ Ft are the factor estimated over the whole sample.
Thus, Stock and Watson (2008) suggest testing for structural breaks by applying N Chow tests
with the Newey and West (1987) HAC covariance estimator. However, as conﬁrmed by the
simulation exercise of Breitung and Eickmeier (2009), in presence of autocorrelation the OLS
estimates are ineﬃcient and the test may perform poorly in small samples. Consequently,
Breitung and Eickmeier (2009) suggest testing for structural breaks by applying an LM test
on a GLS transformation of the model,10 and demonstrate that (thm. 2) the LM statistic for
the i-th variable (si) for testing for a structural break at t = t is distributed as a 2(r) and
therefore LM =
PN
i=1 si  2(Nr).
Figures 11 and 12 show the Breitung and Eickmeier (2009) LM test performed at diﬀerent
horizons. Results indicate clearly two possible break points: one in the ﬁrst half of the eighties,
and one at the start of the new millennium. Moreover, some variables indicate the presence of
a third break point in the mid seventies. We must however express a note of caution regarding
the break point around the 2000 as there is a degrees of freedom problem when computing
the test at the end of the sample: with 8 static factors we have 8 parameter to estimate, thus
testing for structural breaks at t = 2000:1 means estimating a regression with 32 observations,
that is 24 degrees of freedom.
The possibility of a break point in the mid seventies was largely expected: the two oil
shocks of 1974 and 1979 are events likely to change the structure of the model. Similarly a
break point in the ﬁrst half of the eighties is not surprising: 1984 is considered the starting
date of the so called “great moderation”, that is the decline in output growth and inﬂation
variability (for an exhaustive discussion see Galí and Gambetti 2009). In addition, institutional
changes which occurred in housing ﬁnance during the ’80s, such as the abrogation of the so-
called Reg Q (a deposit rate ceiling) and of the state laws capping the mortgage rate, are
likely to have inﬂuenced consistently the model as well. Moreover, the loan crisis of the late
80s changed substantially the housing ﬁnance sector, which progressively switched from a
system based on bank deposits to a system based on the mortgage market: the percentage
of mortgages that were securitized increased from 10% in the 80s to more than 50% in 2006
(Bernanke 2007). In contrast, why a break around 2000? A ﬁrst answer could be: it is a
simple degrees of freedom problem as we have already pointed out. Another possible answer
is the intensiﬁcation of globalization, or the exponential growth of ﬁnancial markets, or the
advent of the “new economy”.
10Let us suppose that the idiosyncratic components evolve over time according to an autoregressive process of
order p, it = i;1it 1 + ::: + i;pit p + vit, with vit  iid(
2
i ), and i(L) = (1   i;1   :::   i;p). The GLS
transformed model is i(L)xit = 
0
ii(L)Ft + i(L)it.14 M. LUCIANI
5.2. Structural Analysis. Having established the presence of structural breaks, we can now
proceed with subsample analysis. In order to do so, the following steps are necessary: (i) in
each subsample, run an OLS estimation of xi = 0
i ^ Ft +i, for i = 1;:::;N, thus obtaining the
new factor loadings; and (ii) estimate a new rotation matrix H.11
We consider two subsamples with each subsample ending in 2007:4 but starting at diﬀerent
dates. According to the evidence provided by the Breitung and Eickmeier (2009) LM test
we estimate the model on a ﬁrst subsample starting on the mid seventies, and on a second
subsample starting in the ﬁrst half of the eighties, while we do not to consider a break around
2000 because, due to the degrees of freedom problem, our subsample estimates would be
extremely unreliable. The ﬁrst subsample starts in 1974:1, that is in coincidence with the
ﬁrst oil shock which determined an 85% increase in the oil price; while the second sub-sample
starts at 1982:4, that is when the Federal Reserves changed its policy rule and switched from
targeting Nonborrowed Reserve to targeting the FED Funds rate (Clarida et al. 2000).
Figure 13 shows the impulse responses of the model when considering the whole sample and
the two subsamples that we have just deﬁned. Overall, the IRF over the three subsamples are
qualitatively identical and quantitatively similar with the main exception being the impact
of housing demand shocks in the third subsample. This result is conﬁrmed by the forecast
error variance decomposition of the common components (ﬁgure 14). In the third subsample
housing demand shocks account for a larger share of business cycle ﬂuctuations: 26% of GDP
growth variation (29% of common component), and for 25% of residential investments growth
variation (32% of the common component).
Evidence of the increased importance of the housing demand shock in business cycle ﬂuctu-
ation is perfectly in line with the ﬁndings of Cardarelli et al. (2008). Cardarelli et al. (2008)
ﬁnd that (i) in countries with advanced housing ﬁnance systems, housing shocks account for
larger variability of output and consumption, and (ii) over time housing demand shocks have
increasingly contributed to consumption volatility. Similarly to Cardarelli et al. (2008), we
interpret our result as a consequence of the ﬁnancial liberalization occurred in the housing
ﬁnance sector. The institutional changes (deregulation) in the housing ﬁnance sector have
changed the transmission mechanism of housing demand shocks. These reforms, by easing the
access to mortgages, increased the share of population that can aﬀord to buy a house: from
1961 to 1991 residential investment grew at an average rate of 1.75% per year, while from 1992
to 2005 it grew at an average annual rate of 5.67%. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly,
these reforms increased the role of housing as a collateral for loans (Iacoviello and Neri 2010)
thus increasing the spillovers from the housing market to the whole economy.
Finally, it is worth noting that, in the third subsample, monetary policy shocks account
for 30% (35% of the common component) of residential investment ﬂuctuations (ﬁgure 13), a
ﬁgure closer to, but still a bit higher than, that estimated by the literature (Jarociñski and
Smets 2008 and Iacoviello and Neri 2010). However, if we further restrict our sample to match
those of Jarociñski and Smets (2008), we obtain that monetary policy shocks account for 22%
of residential investment volatility, a number in line with the aforementioned studies. Beyond
the speciﬁc percentage of variance that monetary policy shocks account for, the important
result here is that the contribution of monetary policy to residential investment volatility
has decrease over time: as pointed out by Bernanke (2007), in a housing ﬁnance sector that
11Step 2 is necessary because the impulse responses are a function of the factor loadings ((L) = C(L)H,
see also equation (2.8)). Hence, once new loadings are estimated, the rotation matrix estimated over the whole
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decreasingly relies on deposits, and with no ceilings operating on deposit rate (Reg Q), the
role of monetary policy in determining residential investment ﬂuctuations decreases.
6. structural shocks and the 2008 recession
In this section we identify the sources that lie behind the ﬂuctuations in this new millennium.
In order to perform this task we present the historical contribution of each shock computed
by using the speciﬁcation with a structural break at 1982:3.
Figure 15 shows the historical decomposition of GDP and residential investment growth.
GDP growth has been strongly inﬂuenced by all ﬁve structural shocks: the contribution of
oil shocks is negative from 2002:3 onwards; productivity shocks contribute in both directions
with four relevant negative peaks: 2000:1, 2000:3, 2003:4, and 2006:4; while monetary policy
contributes positively overall except from 2001:2 to 2002:4, and from 2006:2 onwards.
Particularly relevant is the contribution of aggregate demand shocks which are the main
cause of the 2001 downturn: starting from 2000:4 to 2001:4 the contribution of aggregate
demand shocks to GDP growth has been highly negative due to the negative wealth eﬀect
ensuing the dot com bubble burst and the terrorist attack of 9/11 (in this period the S&P
lost almost 24% of its value, ﬁgure 1). From 2002 onwards, instead, probably because of the
increase in military spending due to the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, on 16 of 24 quarters the
contribution of aggregate demand shock to GDP growth has been positive.
It should be noted that, the contribution of housing demand shocks has been mostly positive
from 2002 onwards due to the diﬀusion of sub-prime mortgages12 and mortgage equity with-
drawals (MEW).13 In section 5.2 we have argued that the increased role of housing demand
shocks in business cycle ﬂuctuations is caused by liberalizations that occurred in the housing
ﬁnance sector during the eighties: these reforms have increase both the share of population
potentially able to buy a house, and the role of housing as collateral for loans. This is also the
case of sub-prime mortgages and MEW: in fact, sub-prime mortgages allowed a larger portion
of population (non-prime borrowers) to access credit and aﬀord a house;14 while, thanks to in-
creasing house prices, households have been able of increasing their expenditure by borrowing
using their house as a collateral (MEW).
Similar observations can be done by looking at residential investments: housing demand
shocks (from 2001:1 to 2005:4), and monetary policy shocks (2002:3 - 2006:1) are the principal
engine for residential investment growth. A minor contribution comes from both productivity
and aggregate demand shocks, while from 2001:3 onwards oil shocks contribute negatively.
Moreover, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) we ﬁnd that monetary policy shocks are the main
cause of the downturn of residential investment starting in 2006:2. This is indeed an important
result. In fact, Leamer (2007) emphasizes that residential investments are the ﬁrst GDP
component to soften before a recession and provides evidence that “eight of the ten [US]
recessions were preceded by sustained and substantial problems in housing, and there was a
more minor problem in housing prior to the 2001 recession. The one clear exception was the
1953 recession, which commenced without problems from housing” (p. 164).
12The proportion of sub-prime mortgage on the whole stock of new mortgage grew from 8 to 22% from 2003
to 2005, Green and Wachter 2007
13Although mortgage equity withdrawal is a source of funding available to households since long ago, households
substantially resorted at MEW only from 2002 (Klyuev and Mills 2007).
14Green and Wachter (2007) report that from 1997 to 2005 while the number of households grew of 9%, the
number of those with a mortgage increased of 20%.16 M. LUCIANI
In conclusion, if we put together our results and those provided by Leamer (2007), we
cannot exclude that monetary policy shocks played a non negligible role in leading the way
for the 2008 recession.
6.1. Some Comments on Historical Decomposition. Figure 15 shows how the begin-
ning of the downturn in residential investments originated from the negative contribution of
monetary policy shocks: Why is that?
Our answer is closely related with the characteristics of sub-prime mortgages. Most of the
sub-prime mortgages were of the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) kind, that provides a ﬁxed
rate for the ﬁrst two or three years, and then a reset to a ﬂoating rate for the remaining years.
Many of these mortgages were issued between 2002 and 2004, that is when the interest rate
was at historical low values (ﬁgure 1).15 Therefore, most of sub-prime borrowers experienced
their ﬁrst interest rate reset when the interest rate had increased substantially. In fact, from
2004:3 to 2006:2 the Federal Reserve raised interest rates to ﬁght the risk of inﬂation. The
unfortunate consequence was that, after the interest rate reset, many non prime borrowers
could no longer aﬀord to pay the installments of their loans: Bernanke (2007) reports that
in June 2006 the proportions of ARMs with serious delinquencies was doubled over mid-
2005. Green and Wachter (2007) perfectly synthesized the events: “the mistake the industry
apparently made was oﬀering a loss-leader price in the early years of a loan in order to get
borrowers into the market, in hopes that they would make up the diﬀerence in later years” (p.
54). Moreover, once problems in sub-prime mortgage arose, the percentage of total mortgages
that were sub-prime mortgages dropped substantially (see Jaﬀee 2008); the collapse of sub-
prime origination caused the collapse in housing demand and consequently the downturn in
residential investment.
The contemporaneous default of so many borrowers, and the decrease in house prices that
followed the collapse of residential investment, implied losses for the banks that could no
longer recover the entire values of their loans. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Green and
Wachter (2007) “[banks] were not capitalized enough to make good on any promises in the
event of large-scale default” (p. 56). Therefore, all mortgage-backed securities became toxic
assets, generating huge losses to all investors (whether they were ﬁnancial institutions or
households). From here, the problem has spread through the ﬁnancial market to the world
economy, precipitating in the 2008 recession.
7. conclusions
In this paper we estimate a Structural Dynamic Factor Model (SDFM) on a panel of 102 US
quarterly series from 1963 to 2007 describing the US economy. We model economic comove-
ments by means of 5 underlying structural shocks (oil price, productivity, aggregate demand,
monetary policy, and housing demand). The impulse response functions estimated with the
benchmark model are in line with those predicted by economic theory and with those usually
estimated by the empirical literature. Variance decompositions show how the contribution
of housing demand shocks is almost negligible thus suggesting that the housing market just
passively reﬂects macroeconomic dynamics.
We investigate the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization and ﬁnd that after reform in the housing
ﬁnance sector started in the early eighties, housing demand shocks account for a relevant
15“Of course, the Fed was pursuing an anti-deﬂation program in 2002   2004. But, [...] the inevitable eﬀect
of the low rates has been an acceleration of the home building clock, transferring building backward in time
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portion of model variability (26% of GDP, and 25% of residential investments), thus pointing
to the importance of the housing market in determining business cycles ﬂuctuations.
The model is then used to analyze the sources that lie behind the ﬂuctuations in this
new millennium. We ﬁnd that monetary policy shocks are the main cause of the downturn of
residential investment that started in early 2006. Hence, given that that residential investment
is the ﬁrst GDP component to soften before a recession (Leamer 2007), we cannot exclude that
monetary policy shocks played a non negligible role in leading the way for the 2008 recession.18 M. LUCIANI
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Appendix A. Data Description and Data Treatment
N





1 INDPRO Industrial Production Index ME yes 2002=100 log 1
2 IPBUSEQ Industrial Production: Business Equipment ME yes 2002=100 log 1
3 IPCONGD Industrial Production: Consumer Goods ME yes 2002=100 log 1
4 IPDCONGD Industrial Production: Durable Consumer Goods ME yes 2002=100 log 1
5 IPDMAT Industrial Production: Durable Materials ME yes 2002=100 log 1
6 IPFINAL Industrial Production: Final Products (Market Group) ME yes 2002=100 log 1
7 IPMAT Industrial Production: Materials ME yes 2002=100 log 1
8 IPNCONGD Industrial Production: Nondurable Consumer Goods ME yes 2002=100 log 1
9 IPNMAT Industrial Production: nondurable Materials ME yes 2002=100 log 1
10 CPIAUCSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items ME yes 1982-84=100 log 2
11 CPIENGSL CPIAUCs: Energy ME yes 1982-84=100 log 2
12 CPILEGSL CPIAUCs: All Items Less Energy ME yes 1982-84=100 log 2
13 CPILFESL CPIAUCs: All Items Less Food & Energy ME yes 1982-84=100 log 2
14 CPIUFDSL CPIAUCs: Food ME yes 1982-84=100 log 2
15 CPIULFSL CPIAUCs: All Items Less Food ME yes 1982-84=100 log 2
16 PPICRM Producer Price Index: Crude Materials for Further Pro-
cessing
ME yes 1982 = 100 log 3
17 PPIENG PPI: Fuels & Related Products & Power ME no 1982 = 100 log 3
18 PPIFCG PPI: Finished Consumer Goods ME yes 1982 = 100 log 3
19 PPIFGS PPI: Finished Goods ME yes 1982 = 100 log 3
20 PPIIDC PPI: Industrial Commodities ME no 1982 = 100 log 3
21 PPICPE PPI: Finished Goods: Capital Equipment ME yes 1982 = 100 log 3
22 PPIACO PPI: All Commodities ME no 1982 = 100 log 3
23 PPIITM PPI: Supplies & Components ME yes 1982 = 100 log 3
24 AMBSL St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base ME yes billions of $ log 4
25 ADJRESSL St. Louis Adjusted Reserves ME yes billions of $ log 4
26 CURRSL Currency Component of M1 ME yes billions of $ log 4
27 M1SL M1 Money Stock ME yes billions of $ log 4
28 M2SL M2 Money Stock ME yes billions of $ log 4
29 BUSLOANS Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial Banks ME yes Bil. of $ log 5
30 CONSUMER Consumer (Individual) Loans at All Commercial Banks ME yes Bil. of $ log 5
31 LOANINV Total Loans and Investments at All Commercial Banks ME yes Bil. of $ log 5
32 LOANS Total Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks ME yes Bil. of $ log 5
33 OTHSEC Other Securities at All Commercial Banks ME yes Bil. of $ log 5
34 REALLN Real Estate Loans at All Commercial Banks ME yes Bil. of $ log 5
35 TOTALSL Total Consumer Credit Outstanding ME yes Bil. of $ log 5
36 GDPC1 Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
37 FINSLC1 Real Final Sales of Domestic Product, 1 Decimal Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
38 GPDIC1 Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, 1 Decimal Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
39 SLCEC1 Real State & Local Cons. Exp. & Gross Investment, 1
Dec.
Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
40 PRFIC1 Real Private Residential Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
41 PNFIC1 Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
42 NRIPDC1 Real Nonresidential Investment: Equipment & Software, 1
Dec.
Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
43 IMPGSC1 Real Imports of Goods & Services, 1 Decimal Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
44 FGCEC Real Federal Cons. Exp. & Gross Investment, 1 Decimal Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
45 GCEC1 Real Government Cons. Exp. & Gross Investment, 1 Dec. Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
46 FPIC1 Real Private Fixed Investment, 1 Decimal Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
47 EXPGSC1 Real Exports of Goods & Services, 1 Decimal Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
48 CBIC1 Real Change in Private Inventories, 1 Decimal Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
 6
49 PCNDGC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable
Goods
Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
50 SLINVC96 Real State & Local Government: Gross Investment Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
51 PCESVC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
52 PCDGCC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
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53 PCECC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
54 DGIC96 Real National Defense Gross Investment Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
55 NDGIC96 Real Federal Nondefense Gross Investment Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
56 DPIC96 Real Disposable Personal Income Q yes Bil. of Ch. 2000
$
log 6
57 PCECTPI Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price In-
dex
Q yes Index 2000=100 log 6
58 GPDICTPI Gross Private Domestic Investment: Chain-type Price In-
dex
Q yes Index 2000=100 log 6
59 GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator Q yes Index 2000=100 log 6
60 GDPCTPI Gross Domestic Product: Chain-type Price Index Q yes Index 2000=100 log 6
61 GNPDEF Gross National Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator Q yes Index 2000=100 log 6
62 GNPCTPI Gross National Product: Chain-type Price Index Q yes Index 2000=100 log 6
63 HOUSTMW Housing Starts in Midwest Census Region MS yes Thous. of Units log 7
64 HOUSTNE Housing Starts in Northeast Census Region MS yes Thous. of Units log 7
65 HOUSTS Housing Starts in South Census Region MS yes Thous. of Units log 7
66 HOUSTW Housing Starts in West Census Region MS yes Thous. of Units log 7
67 PERMIT New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permit MS yes Thous. of Units log 7
68 hp Real House Price Q no index log 7
69 ULCNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
70 COMPRNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
71 COMPNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
72 HOANBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
73 OPHNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Output Per Hour of All Persons Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
74 ULCMFG Manufacturing Sector: Unit Labor Cost Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
75 COMPRMS Manufacturing Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
76 COMPMS Manufacturing Sector: Compensation Per Hour Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
77 HOAMS Manufacturing Sector: Hours of All Persons Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
78 OPHMFG Manufacturing Sector: Output Per Hour of All Persons Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
79 ULCBS Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
80 RCPHBS Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
81 HCOMPBS Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
82 HOABS Business Sector: Hours of All Persons Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
83 OPHPBS Business Sector: Output Per Hour of All Persons Q yes 1992 = 100 log 8
84 MPRIME Bank Prime Loan Rate MA no % none 9
85 FEDFUNDS Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate MA no % none 9
86 AAA Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield MA no % none 9
87 BAA Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield MA no % none 9
88 TB3MS 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate MA no % none 9
89 TB6MS 6-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate MA no % none 9
90 GS1 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate MA no % none 9
91 GS3 3-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate MA no % none 9
92 GS5 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate MA no % none 9
93 GS10 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate MA no % none 9
94 CIVPART Civilian Participation Rate MA no %  10
95 EMRATIO Civilian Employment-Population Ratio MA no %  10
96 CLF16OV Civilian Labor Force ME no Thous. log 10
97 CE16OV Civilian Employment ME no Thous. log 10
98 UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate MA no %  10
99 UEMPLT5 Civilians Unemployed - Less Than 5 Weeks ME no Thous. log 10
100 UEMP5TO14 Civilian Unemployed for 5-14 Weeks ME no Thous. log 10
101 UEMP15T26 Civilians Unemployed for 15-26 Weeks ME no Thous. log 10
102 UEMP27OV Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks and Over ME no Thous. log 10
103 UEMPMEAN Average (Mean) Duration of Unemployment MA no Weeks log 10
104 UNEMPLOY Unemployed ME no Thous. log 10
105 PAYEMS Total Nonfarm Payrolls: All Employees ME no Thous. log 10
106 MANEMP Employees on Nonfarm Payrolls: Manufacturing ME no Thous. log 10
107 DMANEMP All Employees: Durable Goods Manufacturing ME no Thous. log 10
108 NDMANEMP All Employees: Nondurable Goods Manufacturing ME no Thous. log 10
109 SRVPRD All Employees: Service-Providing Industries ME no Thous. log 10
110 USCONS All Employees: Construction ME no Thous. log 10
111 USEHS All Employees: Education & Health Services ME no Thous. log 10
112 USFIRE All Employees: Financial Activities ME no Thous. log 10
113 USGOOD All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries ME no Thous. log 10
114 USGOVT All Employees: Government ME no Thous. log 10
115 USINFO All Employees: Information Services ME no Thous. log 10
116 USLAH All Employees: Leisure & Hospitality ME no Thous. log 10
117 USMINE All Employees: Natural Resources & Mining ME no Thous. log 10
118 USPBS All Employees: Professional & Business Services ME no Thous. log 10
119 USPRIV All Employees: Total Private Industries ME no Thous. log 10
120 USSERV All Employees: Other Services ME no Thous. log 10
121 USTPU All Employees: Trade, Transportation & Utilities ME no Thous. log 10References 23
122 USTRADE All Employees: Retail Trade ME no Thous. log 10
123 USWTRADE All Employees: Wholesale Trade ME no Thous. log 10
124 OILPRICE Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate MA no $ per Barrel log 11
125 NAPM ISM Manufacturing: PMI Composite Index MA yes index  11
126 usa04025 Business Surveys, ISM Manufacturing, Employment MA yes index  11
127 usa04010 Business Surveys, ISM Manufacturing, New orders MA yes index  11
128 usa04005 Business Surveys, ISM Manufacturing, Production MA yes index  11
129 usa15525 Dow Jones, Averages, Industrial Index, Price Return MA no index log 12
130 usa15505 Standard & Poors, 500 Composite, Index, Price Return MA no index log 12
NOTE: All series are from the Fred II database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis with the exception of series 68 and
of series 125-129. Series 68 is the Census Bureau House Price Index (new one-family houses sold including value of lot) that
has been deﬂated with the implicit price deﬂator for the nonfarm business sector (IPDNBS) taken from the Fred II database.
Series 126-130 are taken from Ecowin.
Abbreviations
Categories Original Frequency Transformation
1 = Industrial Production Q = Quarterly  = ﬁrst diﬀerence
2 = Consumer Price Indexes M = monthly log = natural logarithm
3 = Producer Price Indexes E = value at the end of quarter
4 = Monetary Aggregates S = Sum over the quarter
5 = Banking A = Average of the quarter
6 = GDP and Components
7 = Housing Sector
8 = Productivity & Cost
9 = Interest Rates
10 = Employment and Population
11 = Business/Fiscal
12 = Financial Markets24 References
Appendix B. Variables Selection
N
 Series ID R
2 j1 j2 1 2    ML
1 INDPRO 0.89 7 6 0.77 0.65 0.14 0.03 x
2 IPBUSEQ 0.73 1 6 0.54 0.53 0.11 0.17 x
3 IPCONGD 0.67 6 8 0.83 0.72 0.12 0.22 o
4 IPDCONGD 0.63 3 6 0.60 0.49 0.09 0.24 x
5 IPDMAT 0.79 7 1 0.65 0.48 0.11 0.03 x
6 IPFINAL 0.75 3 1 0.83 0.65 0.12 0.08 o
7 IPMAT 0.80 1 5 0.77 0.65 0.10 0.01 o
8 IPNCONGD 0.36 3 6 0.72 0.60 0.10 0.24 x
9 IPNMAT 0.66 7 1 0.45 0.38 0.10 0.02 x
10 CPIAUCSL 0.89 15 13 0.73 0.56 0.11 0.00 x
11 CPIENGSL 0.71 15 10 0.54 0.40 0.10 0.23 x
12 CPILEGSL 0.84 13 10 0.66 0.55 0.12 0.07 x
13 CPILFESL 0.80 15 12 0.70 0.66 0.12 0.13 x
14 CPIUFDSL 0.45 20 15 0.52 0.46 0.09 0.08 x
15 CPIULFSL 0.81 10 13 0.73 0.70 0.11 0.11 x
16 PPICRM 0.63 22 57 0.48 0.33 0.10 0.06 x
17 PPIENG 0.81 20 14 0.55 0.37 0.11 0.01 x
18 PPIFCG 0.83 19 14 0.95 0.45 0.10 0.14 o
19 PPIFGS 0.86 18 14 0.95 0.39 0.10 0.15 x
20 PPIIDC 0.87 17 14 0.55 0.52 0.10 0.05 x
21 PPICPE 0.76 23 20 0.38 0.33 0.10 0.37 x
22 PPIACO 0.89 16 15 0.48 0.43 0.11 0.05 x
23 PPIITM 0.82 20 10 0.49 0.42 0.10 0.28 x
24 AMBSL 0.46 25 26 0.77 0.62 0.14 0.01 x
25 ADJRESSL 0.35 24 57 0.77 0.49 0.13 0.27 x
26 CURRSL 0.39 24 75 0.62 0.32 0.09 0.38 x
27 M1SL 0.54 25 24 0.37 0.36 0.10 0.35 x
28 M2SL 0.54 118 86 0.26 0.25 0.08 0.37 x
29 BUSLOANS 0.45 32 31 0.67 0.47 0.10 0.46 x
30 CONSUMER 0.52 35 118 0.51 0.36 0.09 0.45 x
31 LOANINV 0.44 32 29 0.77 0.47 0.12 0.12 x
32 LOANS 0.63 31 29 0.77 0.67 0.14 0.19 x
33 OTHSEC 0.09 31 29 0.46 0.22 0.07 0.17 o
34 REALLN 0.47 32 46 0.37 0.31 0.11 0.35 x
35 TOTALSL 0.57 30 108 0.51 0.26 0.09 0.50 x
36 GDPC1 0.85 38 83 0.75 0.64 0.15 0.21 x
37 FINSLC1 0.83 48 38 0.63 0.55 0.12 0.09 x
38 GPDIC1 0.58 36 48 0.75 0.74 0.15 0.18 x
39 SLCEC1 0.51 50 83 0.82 0.45 0.10 0.08 x
40 PRFIC1 0.64 46 104 0.54 0.31 0.10 0.07 x
41 PNFIC1 0.64 42 46 0.81 0.73 0.12 0.13 x
42 NRIPDC1 0.60 41 46 0.81 0.62 0.11 0.06 o
43 IMPGSC1 0.25 47 81 0.53 0.31 0.08 0.28 x
44 FGCEC1 0.39 45 54 0.86 0.41 0.11 0.05 o
45 GCEC1 0.60 44 79 0.86 0.58 0.12 0.03 x
46 FPIC1 0.73 41 42 0.73 0.62 0.12 0.17 o
47 EXPGSC1 0.09 43 54 0.53 0.22 0.07 0.40 x
48 CBIC1 0.37 38 37 0.74 0.63 0.13 0.23 x
49 PCNDGC96 0.42 53 5 0.50 0.25 0.08 0.09 x
50 SLINVC96 0.40 39 83 0.82 0.47 0.11 0.09 o
51 PCESVC96 0.48 52 109 0.31 0.24 0.08 0.02 x
52 PCDGCC96 0.54 53 37 0.68 0.38 0.11 0.27 x
53 PCECC96 0.76 52 49 0.68 0.50 0.11 0.05 x
54 DGIC96 0.23 44 45 0.41 0.35 0.10 0.23 x
55 NDGIC96 0.21 52 53 0.23 0.21 0.07 0.06 x
56 DPIC96 0.34 41 25 0.20 0.20 0.07 0.33 x
57 PCECTPI 0.90 60 62 0.50 0.50 0.13 0.14 x
58 GPDICTPI 0.75 62 60 0.41 0.40 0.11 0.22 x
59 GDPDEF 0.89 61 60 1.00 0.94 0.14 0.00 o
60 GDPCTPI 0.90 62 61 1.00 0.94 0.15 0.10 x
61 GNPDEF 0.89 59 62 1.00 0.94 0.14 0.00 o
62 GNPCTPI 0.90 60 61 1.00 0.94 0.15 0.10 o
63 HOUSTMW 0.31 65 83 0.31 0.27 0.09 0.34 x
64 HOUSTNE 0.18 22 65 0.22 0.20 0.08 0.44 x
65 HOUSTS 0.42 63 110 0.31 0.31 0.08 0.05 x
66 HOUSTW 0.64 67 114 0.74 0.33 0.11 0.64 x
67 PERMIT 0.67 66 69 0.74 0.44 0.12 0.62 x
68 hp 0.15 58 93 0.36 0.22 0.08 0.23 x
69 ULCNFB 0.83 71 72 0.97 0.86 0.16 0.52 o
70 COMPRNFB 0.86 71 72 0.83 0.79 0.15 0.48 o
71 COMPNFB 0.86 69 72 0.97 0.91 0.17 0.47 oReferences 25
72 HOANBS 0.86 71 69 0.91 0.86 0.15 0.51 o
73 OPHNFB 0.75 83 36 0.78 0.56 0.13 0.18 o
74 ULCMFG 0.62 78 76 0.66 0.55 0.13 0.06 x
75 COMPRMS 0.52 76 74 0.93 0.52 0.14 0.01 x
76 COMPMS 0.63 75 74 0.93 0.55 0.14 0.02 x
77 HOAMS 0.83 36 106 0.48 0.43 0.14 0.05 x
78 OPHMFG 0.32 74 77 0.66 0.35 0.10 0.15 x
79 ULCBS 0.83 45 81 0.58 0.57 0.13 0.03 x
80 RCPHBS 0.63 81 79 0.85 0.48 0.16 0.04 x
81 HCOMPBS 0.72 80 79 0.85 0.57 0.15 0.11 x
82 HOABS 0.81 36 83 0.48 0.32 0.11 0.23 x
83 OPHPBS 0.76 73 36 0.78 0.64 0.13 0.22 x
84 MPRIME 0.67 85 93 0.68 0.54 0.10 0.19 x
85 FEDFUNDS 0.71 88 84 0.70 0.68 0.11 0.05 x
86 AAA 0.78 87 93 0.77 0.74 0.12 0.00 o
87 BAA 0.77 86 93 0.77 0.58 0.11 0.11 o
88 TB3MS 0.76 89 90 0.92 0.74 0.12 0.03 x
89 TB6MS 0.84 88 90 0.92 0.90 0.14 0.08 o
90 GS1 0.89 89 88 0.90 0.74 0.16 0.08 x
91 GS3 0.90 92 93 0.93 0.72 0.16 0.02 x
92 GS5 0.87 91 93 0.93 0.88 0.15 0.01 o
93 GS10 0.82 92 86 0.88 0.74 0.13 0.00 x
94 CIVPART 0.19 95 96 0.83 0.63 0.09 0.10 o
95 EMRATIO 0.72 94 97 0.83 0.61 0.09 0.04 x
96 CLF16OV 0.27 97 94 0.88 0.63 0.09 0.28 o
97 CE16OV 0.65 96 95 0.88 0.61 0.09 0.28 x
98 UNRATE 0.85 104 94 0.50 0.33 0.10 0.02 x
99 UEMPLT5 0.27 104 96 0.53 0.32 0.08 0.22 x
100 UEMP5TO14 0.49 104 98 0.49 0.27 0.07 0.33 x
101 UEMP15T26 0.48 80 81 0.33 0.32 0.10 0.27 x
102 UEMP27OV 0.58 104 103 0.51 0.47 0.09 0.34 x
103 UEMPMEAN 0.66 102 119 0.47 0.25 0.09 0.04 x
104 UNEMPLOY 0.72 99 102 0.53 0.51 0.09 0.16 x
105 PAYEMS 0.95 119 109 0.82 0.66 0.13 0.22 o
106 MANEMP 0.90 107 113 0.91 0.70 0.15 0.30 o
107 DMANEMP 0.89 106 113 0.91 0.60 0.13 0.24 x
108 NDMANEMP 0.77 106 113 0.62 0.50 0.12 0.25 x
109 SRVPRD 0.88 105 121 0.66 0.53 0.14 0.36 x
110 USCONS 0.68 107 106 0.45 0.41 0.11 0.17 x
111 USEHS 0.46 120 48 0.43 0.26 0.09 0.20 x
112 USFIRE 0.53 67 110 0.35 0.34 0.09 0.59 x
113 USGOOD 0.93 106 119 0.70 0.61 0.13 0.29 x
114 USGOVT 0.48 109 105 0.50 0.42 0.09 0.26 x
115 USINFO 0.54 72 119 0.35 0.30 0.08 0.17 x
116 USLAH 0.49 109 70 0.34 0.24 0.07 0.04 x
117 USMINE 0.24 113 1 0.42 0.32 0.09 0.18 x
118 USPBS 0.62 109 130 0.48 0.38 0.10 0.53 x
119 USPRIV 0.96 105 113 0.82 0.61 0.14 0.12 x
120 USSERV 0.66 111 43 0.43 0.23 0.10 0.34 x
121 USTPU 0.85 122 109 0.81 0.53 0.10 0.12 x
122 USTRADE 0.71 121 109 0.81 0.38 0.10 0.02 o
123 USWTRADE 0.78 121 85 0.36 0.23 0.07 0.40 x
124 OILPRICE 0.60 60 62 0.38 0.38 0.09 0.01 x
125 NAPM 0.81 128 127 0.77 0.75 0.12 0.07 o
126 usa04025 0.73 125 128 0.63 0.41 0.10 0.20 x
127 usa04010 0.71 125 128 0.75 0.71 0.12 0.15 x
128 usa04005 0.72 125 127 0.77 0.71 0.11 0.15 x
129 usa15525 0.27 130 118 0.93 0.34 0.10 0.10 o
130 usa15505 0.25 129 118 0.93 0.38 0.10 0.16 x
k1k is the highest cross-correlation coeﬃcient of variable i and k2k is the
second highest coeﬃcient. j1 indicates the variable with which variable i has
the highest correlated, and j2 refers to the second variable.   is the average
cross correlation of variable i with all other variables.  is the ﬁrst order
autocorrelation coeﬃcient. Finally in the column “ML” , “x” stands for not
eliminated, while “o” indicates that the variable have been eliminated.26 References
Table 3. Variables Selection
Highest Cross-Correlation Autocorrelation of order 1
All ML SW All ML SW
N 130 102 87 130 102 87
jj > :5 73.8462 56.8627 32.1839 5.3846 3.9216 2.2989
jj > :6 60.7692 38.2353 22.9885 1.5385 0 1.1494
jj > :7 48.4615 14.7059 20.6897 0 0 0
jj > :8 30.7692 6.8627 11.4943 0 0 0
jj > :9 14.6154 0 2.2989 0 0 0
N 1 PN
i=1  0.1110 0.1102 0.1041 0.1826 0.1897 0.1913
Note: Column All indicates result on the entire database, column ML indicates results after
the procedure is applied, and ﬁnally column SW indicates results if we would have applied the
Stock and Watson (2008) procedure
Appendix C. Tables
Table 4. Determining the Number of Static Factors:
Bai and Ng (2002) Criteria
Factors M.R2 A.R2 AR(1) IC1 IC2 IC3 % GDP
1 0.2319 0.2319 0.7239 -0.2052 -0.1983 -0.2241 0.6243
2 0.1557 0.3876 0.8241 -0.3675 -0.3536 -0.4053 0.6244
3 0.0653 0.4529 0.5623 -0.416 -0.3951 -0.4727 0.6416
4 0.0549 0.5078 0.4117 -0.4575 -0.4297 -0.5331 0.6421
5 0.0438 0.5516 0.393 -0.4864 -0.4517 -0.5809 0.6489
6 0.0327 0.5843 0.0726 -0.498 -0.4564 -0.6114 0.7049
7 0.0291 0.6134 0.1968 -0.5064 -0.4578 -0.6386 0.7504
8 0.0278 0.6413 0.0533 -0.5168 -0.4613 -0.668 0.9096
9 0.0234 0.6646 0.171 -0.5199 -0.4575 -0.69 0.9155
10 0.0205 0.6851 -0.0539 -0.5188 -0.4494 -0.7077 0.9201
11 0.0183 0.7034 0.0605 -0.5145 -0.4381 -0.7223 0.9203
12 0.017 0.7204 0.0903 -0.5092 -0.4259 -0.7359 0.9347
13 0.0163 0.7367 0.0482 -0.5051 -0.4149 -0.7508 0.9505
14 0.0153 0.752 -0.0106 -0.5007 -0.4035 -0.7652 0.9574
15 0.014 0.766 -0.1636 -0.4945 -0.3904 -0.7779 0.9614
16 0.0126 0.7786 0.0276 -0.4854 -0.3743 -0.7878 0.9617
17 0.0118 0.7903 0.2317 -0.4757 -0.3577 -0.797 0.9623
18 0.0112 0.8015 0.1432 -0.4662 -0.3413 -0.8064 0.9652
19 0.0105 0.812 0.055 -0.4562 -0.3244 -0.8153 0.9677
20 0.0098 0.8217 -0.0152 -0.4453 -0.3065 -0.8233 0.9679
Note: The ﬁrst column is the additional percentage of total variance explained by the r-th factor, while
column two is the cumulative share of total variance explained by the ﬁrst r factors. The third column is
the ﬁrst order autocorrelation coeﬃcient for each factor. Columns IC1, IC2, and IC3 are the Bai and Ng
(2002) criteria where bold entries are the minimum for each criteria. Finally, in the last column is shown
the cumulative share of GDP variance explained by the ﬁrst r factorsReferences 27
Table 5. Determining the Number of Dynamic Factors:
Bai and Ng (2007)
q D1 D2 ci
1 0.4813 0.8120 1.8692
2 0.3871 0.6539 1.5414
3 0.3247 0.5270 1.2397
4 0.3109 0.4151 1.0396
5 0.2425 0.2750 0.9956
6 0.1208 0.1297 0.7766
7 0.0472 0.0472 0.3868
8 0.1512
1) Both criteria have been computed us-
ing the correlation matrix of the uts. 
= 0.1, and m = 1.25 for D1k, while m =
2.25 for D2k as suggested by Bai and Ng
(2007).
2) In the third column are the eigenvalues
of u in decreasing order.
3) q : Di < M, i = 1;2, where M =
0:1573 for D1, and M = 0:2831 for D2.
Table 6. Determining the Number of Dynamic Factors:




1 -0.5448 -0.5378 -0.5638 0.5644 0.5666 0.5583
2 -0.5977 -0.5837 -0.6357 0.5248 0.5292 0.5126
3 -0.6074 -0.5864 -0.6644 0.5108 0.5175 0.4926
4 -0.6151 -0.5872 -0.6911 0.5001 0.5091 0.4759
5 -0.6237 -0.5888 -0.7187 0.4913 0.5025 0.4610
6 -0.6307 -0.5888 -0.7447 0.4851 0.4985 0.4487
7 -0.6296 -0.5806 -0.7625 0.4835 0.4992 0.4410
8 -0.6261 -0.5703 -0.7781 0.4840 0.5019 0.4355
Y
B
1 -0.5904 -0.5834 -0.6094 0.5388 0.5409 0.5331
2 -0.6488 -0.6348 -0.6868 0.4981 0.5023 0.4867
3 -0.6621 -0.6411 -0.7190 0.4830 0.4893 0.4660
4 -0.6738 -0.6458 -0.7497 0.4712 0.4795 0.4484
5 -0.6839 -0.6490 -0.7789 0.4621 0.4726 0.4337
6 -0.6943 -0.6524 -0.8083 0.4550 0.4676 0.4209
7 -0.6950 -0.6461 -0.8280 0.4529 0.4676 0.4131
8 -0.6914 -0.6355 -0.8433 0.4535 0.4702 0.408028 References




5 0.0240 0.0430 0.0590
q0 6 x 0.9540 0.5670
7 x x 0.3190
This table shows p-values for the test pro-
posed by Onatski (2009) for H0: q = q0 vs.
H1: q0 < q < q1 + 1. The Descrete Fourier
Transformation of the data is computed for
!j = 2sj=T , with sj 2 [1;:::;40].
Table 8. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
Averaged over All Common Components
years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 34.8221 16.8902 9.2014 10.5179 8.7499 8.6235 6.7059 4.4891
1 37.3378 18.3853 7.8992 6.9641 11.6248 9.1880 4.3630 4.2378
2 37.6053 18.2070 7.7210 6.6806 11.7840 9.3346 4.3818 4.2857
5 38.1111 17.7038 7.5572 6.5057 11.8659 9.5157 4.4992 4.2414
Table 9. Long Run Eﬀects of Shocks on GDP and Components
Variable "oil "p "ad "mp "hd
Gross Domestic Product -0.753 0.837 0 0 0
Final Sales of Domestic Product -0.846 0.941 -0.245 -0.180 -0.324
Gross Private Domestic Investment -0.419 0.355 0.192 0.010 0.303
SLCEC1? -0.646 0.799 -0.381 0.197 -0.129
Private Residential Fixed Investment -0.445 0.451 -0.405 -0.181 -0.023
Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment -0.628 0.465 0.162 -0.292 -0.046
Imports of Goods & Services -0.541 0.196 -0.001 -0.052 0.159
GCEC1?? -0.242 0.706 -0.064 -0.066 -0.045
Exports of Goods & Services -0.170 0.124 -0.017 -0.040 0.012
Change in Private Inventories -0.003 0.048 0.208 0.268 0.491
Personal Consumption Expenditures -0.935 0.704 -0.283 0.017 -0.351
PCE: Nondurable Goods -0.847 0.567 -0.411 0.259 -0.145
PCE: Services -0.727 0.480 -0.271 -0.209 -0.186
PCE: Durable Goods -0.614 0.544 -0.090 -0.023 -0.366
National Defense Gross Investment 0.260 0.235 0.397 -0.317 -0.035
Federal Nondefense Gross Investment 0.024 0.295 -0.008 -0.022 0.161
Disposable Personal Income -0.658 0.184 0.039 -0.090 -0.060
Note: all variables are in real terms.
? State & Local Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment.
?? Government Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment.References 29
Table 10. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition




l 0 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 89.4659 4.4537 4.9258 0.6789 0.4757
2 89.3256 4.4903 4.9312 0.7773 0.4756
5 88.9885 4.5299 5.0588 0.9488 0.4740

y
0 0.7794 43.0728 55.2036 0.0000 0.9442
1 6.8264 29.3638 39.2306 23.6651 0.9141
2 7.1411 28.8214 39.2068 23.9397 0.8911
5 7.1078 28.3127 38.9465 24.7517 0.8813

p
0 91.0457 2.5243 6.2213 0.2088 0.0000
1 62.8039 8.8163 20.3447 7.8296 0.2054
2 54.3131 7.7443 21.3258 16.3961 0.2207
5 50.4155 7.2068 21.3613 20.7751 0.2413
i
0 0.3263 14.8617 41.3630 37.3852 6.0638
1 12.5941 11.6471 41.1401 34.0135 0.6052
2 11.0847 8.9034 36.3677 43.1823 0.4619
5 9.7234 7.1242 33.6059 49.1179 0.4286

I
h 0 0.4573 11.5445 24.8517 61.6646 1.4818
1 10.0877 10.3502 27.4585 50.8099 1.2937
2 9.7565 10.0244 27.0147 51.9453 1.2591
5 9.7212 9.9914 26.9463 52.0828 1.2583

p
h 0 5.1980 22.6587 0.0050 68.7723 3.3660
1 6.0334 22.9067 1.1924 66.7309 3.1366
2 6.6836 22.7209 2.3599 65.2048 3.0308
5 6.8521 21.6773 3.8925 64.7062 2.8720
Results refer to common components.30 References
Table 11. 5 years FEVD for GDP and Components
Variable "oil "p "ad "mp "hd
Gross Domestic Product 7.1078 28.313 38.946 24.752 0.88134
Final Sales of Domestic Product 9.1708 29.152 23.651 27.351 10.675
Gross Private Domestic Investment 4.5948 7.8359 42.562 24.811 20.197
SLCEC1? 14.022 66.341 2.3604 9.8741 7.4028
Private Residential Fixed Investment 9.7212 9.9914 26.946 52.083 1.2583
Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment 8.9506 4.5969 45.693 39.803 0.95618
Imports of Goods & Services 11.433 4.2338 40.517 34.104 9.7115
GCEC1?? 1.7237 85.063 0.9973 11.012 1.2042
Exports of Goods & Services 17.262 6.5681 35.302 39.916 0.952
Change in Private Inventories 1.3162 4.7804 16.791 22.513 54.599
Personal Consumption Expenditures 17.972 12.801 34.291 22.737 12.199
PCE: Nondurable Goods 28.004 13.239 31.524 24.09 3.1429
PCE: Services 17.805 6.689 22.237 41.782 11.487
PCE: Durable Goods 12.831 17.048 37.04 16.916 16.165
National Defense Gross Investment 9.0153 66.17 7.7847 16.144 0.88545
Federal Nondefense Gross Investment 0.92343 62.573 1.9311 11.987 22.586
Disposable Personal Income 33.506 4.2972 46.384 15.066 0.74772
Note: all variables are in real terms. Results refer to common components.
? State & Local Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment.
?? Government Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment.References 31
Appendix D. Graphs
Figure 1. Selected Variables in the Database





















Consumption − Nondurable Goods










Consumption − Durable Goods


























































10−Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate


















All series have been diﬀerenced, demeaned and standardized but the FED Funds, and the 10y bond Rate that are in levels32 References
Figure 2. Determining the Number of Static Factors
Alessi et al. (2007)





















Straight lines are the number of selected factors by each criteria as the value of the penalty function changes. Dotted lines is
the variance of the number of factors selected in each subsample (see Alessi et al. 2008)
Figure 3. Determining the Number of Dynamic Factors
Hallin and Li˜ ska (2007)






IC1 − log criterion






IC2 − log criterion






IC3 − log criterion
Straight lines are the number of selected factors by each criteria as the value of the penalty function changes. Dotted lines is
the variance of the number of factors selected in each subsample (see Hallin and Li˜ ska 2007)References 33
Figure 4. Impulse Response Functions





















































































































































































































Thick straight lines are the Impulse Responses, thin straight lines are the 68% bootstrap conﬁdence band, while dashed line
are the median of the bootstrap distribution. All Responses are cumulated but for the FED Funds rate.
Figure 5. Impulse Response Functions
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All Responses are cumulated but for the FED Funds rate.34 References
Figure 6. Impulse Response to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 7. Impulse Response Functions for diﬀerent r and p























































































































































































































Solid thick lines are IRF with r = 8 and p = 1, dashed thick lines are IRF with r = 8 and p = 2, dotted tick lines are IRF with
r = 9 and p = 1, and thin straight lines are 68% bootstrap conﬁdence band obtained over the whole sample. All Responses are
cumulated but for the FED Funds rate.References 35
Figure 8. 5 Years Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for diﬀerent r and p
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Black bars are FEVD with r = 8 and p = 1, gray bars are FEVD with r = 8 and p = 2, and white bars are FEVD with r = 9
and p = 1. Results refer to common components.
Figure 9. Impulse Response Functions for diﬀerent q






























































































Solid thick lines are IRF with q = 5, dotted thick lines are IRF with q = 4, dashed thick lines are IRF with q = 3, and thin
straight lines are 68% bootstrap conﬁdence band obtained over the whole sample. All Responses are cumulated but for the
FED Funds rate.36 References
Figure 10. 5 Years Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for diﬀerent q











































































































Black bars are FEVD with q = 5, gray bars are FEVD with q = 4, and white bars are FEVD with q = 3. Results refer to
common components.References 37
Figure 11. Breitung and Eickmeier (2009) Structural Break Test


















LM Relative Frequencies of Rejections





Residual Sum of Squares
The 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values for the statistics are respectively 904.5,875.25, and 859.93. H0 = No Break.
The Residual Sum of Squares is the average of RSSi obtained from the auxiliary regression necessary to compute the statistic
si. Here, the smaller the sum of square residual, the higher the probability of being in presence of a structural break.
The Relative Frequency of Rejection is the share of variables that at each date reject the null
Figure 12. Breitung and Eickmeier (2009) Structural Break Test
p-values for selected variables




















































Solid line are p-values, while dotted line indicates 5% and 10%. H0 = No Break38 References
Figure 13. Impulse Response Functions
Estimation on Diﬀerent Sub-Samples





















































































































































































































Solid thick line is the benchmark model (whole sample), dashed thick line are obtained over the subsample starting at 1974:1,
dotted thick line are obtained cover the subsample starting at 1982:4, and thin straight lines are 68% bootstrap conﬁdence
band obtained over the whole sample. All Responses are cumulated but for the FED Funds rate.
Figure 14. 5 Years Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Estimation on Diﬀerent Sub-Samples
































































































































































































Black bars are the benchmark model (whole sample), dark gray bars are obtained over the subsample starting at 1974:1, and
white bars are obtained over the subsample starting at 1982:4. Results refer to common components.References 39
Figure 15. Historical Decomposition


























































































































































The shades areas are respectively the GDP and residential investment standardized growth rate. The baseline of the shaded
area is ﬁxed so that it correspond to zero in the non transformed series.